The Strategy Sessions is a limited-run podcast hosted by Emma Ashford, a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center. Today, Emma talks with Jennifer Lind, an associate professor of Government at Dartmouth College. Emma and Jenny discuss prioritization, burden shifting, and how a strong progressive grand strategy can benefit the wider U.S. foreign policy debate. Emma and Jenny’s discussion is part of the New Visions for Grand Strategy Project, a collection of essays, videos, and podcasts in which out-of-the box thinkers discuss the future of U.S. foreign policy. *The Strategy Sessions Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
The Strategy Sessions is a limited-run podcast hosted by Emma Ashford, a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center. Today, Emma talks with Jennifer Lind, an associate professor of Government at Dartmouth College. Emma and Jenny discuss prioritization, burden shifting, and how a strong progressive grand strategy can benefit the wider U.S. foreign policy debate.
Emma and Jenny’s discussion is part of the New Visions for Grand Strategy Project, a collection of essays, videos, and podcasts in which out-of-the box thinkers discuss the future of U.S. foreign policy.
*The Strategy Sessions Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Emma Ashford: The 2020s are likely to be a pivotal decade in determining the future of America’s role in the world. Global dynamics are changing. The era of unchallenged U.S. global dominance is ending. And China and other states are rising. At home, the United States is also going through a period of transition and change in foreign policy - from bipartisan consensus, to debate and division. The only thing certain is that change in U.S. foreign policy is inevitable.
In these discussions, our guests engage with some of the most challenging questions facing U.S. policymakers, bring distinct perspectives to bear on these questions, and offer their own vision for the future of U.S. Grand Strategy. These are the strategy sessions.
Hello, I'm Emma Ashford, a Senior Fellow in the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center. Welcome to the Strategy Sessions, a series of discussions with forward-looking, out-of-the-box thinkers on the future of U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy. Joining me today virtually is Jennifer Lind, an Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth.
Welcome, Jenny!
[00:01:19] Jennifer Lind: Hi. Thank you so much for having me.
[00:01:21] Emma Ashford: So, you have, like many of our other guests, written pretty widely on U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy. And I'm excited to talk a little bit about the piece you wrote for us, which is on the varieties of progressive grand strategy. But before we do that, I wanted to start with some big, broad questions. We're clearly entering some new period in the global environment, whether it's multipolarity, bipolarity, something else. I'm curious to know how you see the world, and I suspect that your answer might be a little different than some of the folks that talk about multipolarity, because you wrote a piece recently on bipolarity in world affairs. And so, could you tell us just a little bit about how you see the world that's emerging?
[00:02:08] Jennifer Lind: Absolutely. I see a few really dramatic changes in the world relative to, say, the immediate post–Cold War era. So, if you look back to the 1990s, you see that the U.S. enjoyed a position of primacy. There were no other great powers to challenge us. We also had a budget surplus. We also had a generally stable and pretty consensus-based foreign policy around, sort of, a right, left, centrist coalition in favor of an approach known as global leadership.
So, things have really changed, obviously, if you look back to that era. Today, U.S. power has declined, in a relative sense, notably with the rise of China and its emergence as a potential regional hegemon. And we also face resurgent and resentful Russia. So, this is the new world that we're in. I should also mention the budget situation. Now, we're in a situation of great fiscal constraint, or we should be exercising fiscal constraint. And I'm not sure that we actually are. We're looking at some real problems with growing entitlement costs and so on. And also, when we talk about the U.S., the sort of political situation, that that's not one where there's a whole lot of consensus around our grand strategy anymore.
So, based on all of these changes, the U.S. role in the world is going to have to change as well. In that previous dominant balance of power, we assumed, or we tried to assume this role of, kind of, a global hegemon. And this really is not an option anymore. So, increasingly, we're going to have to be more careful about our choices, more focused in our choices. And in my view, that should be on Asia, which is where our primary security threat is. And we also need to ask more of our partners, which is something that we did not do during that period of primacy. So, those partnerships and alliances that we have, they need to be updated too. They need to be updated for a new era, a new balance of power, and a new threat environment.
[00:04:25] Emma Ashford: So, it sounds like you're saying, sort of, it's a combination of... There are some power dynamics, the balance of power globally is changing a bit, but it's either being... I'm not sure if you're saying compounded by or if we, sort of, we also have these domestic constraints and issues that have arisen, but it's, kind of, a combination of both that's driving the need for foreign policy change.
[00:04:48] Jennifer Lind: Absolutely. So, you can imagine a changing balance of power, but you could have a situation where, for example, in the early 1990s, the balance of power changed. But we started over, you know, moving into the Clinton administration, we had a budget surplus, right? So, that was a situation where the threat environment got more favorable, and the budgetary situation was more favorable. Today, we have the opposite, which is the worsening threat environment and a worsening financial situation.
And then, of course, political unity and a, kind of, sense of national purpose and shared national purpose has always been one of these, kind of, important things that is within foreign policymaking. And the United States just doesn't have that at the moment. We're extremely divided. We're extremely polarized. So, all of these things, in my mind, are pointing to a big change in the U.S. ability to wield power relative to what we enjoyed in the past few decades.
[00:05:52] Emma Ashford: Yeah. So, let's talk for a minute about not the U.S., because I agree with you on the domestic front. You talked about Asia as the most important region. I assume that, you know, you're mostly talking about China. But I was wondering if you could just give us a little rundown of how you see, sort of, I mean, the global balance of power, right? Which are the states that are really important to think about for the U.S.? Where are they found? Is this one of those things where we really just need to focus on one region? Is this some global competition? What do you think?
[00:06:24] Jennifer Lind: Well, the U.S. has a whole range of different interests. And so, we would want to ask, what are the range of those interests? And then what are the countries that are either threatening those interests? And then what are the, kind of, partners and allies that will help us advance those interests? And so, you know, political scientists can talk about a hierarchy of what are the really important core, primary national interests versus those that are kind of further down the list in terms of priorities.
So, in U.S. foreign policy, U.S. national security, the specter of a rival regional hegemon has always been one of the, kind of, core national security issues that, across very different time periods and very different political administrations, you see it to be a very strong priority of American leaders to prevent the rise of a rival regional hegemon. That's an issue right now, because unlike the immediate post–Cold War era, where we didn't have competing great powers, today we actually do have a contender for a rival regional hegemon, which, of course, is China. So, that makes China and Asia, therefore, a really important focus for U.S. national security.
There are not other rival regional hegemons. So, obviously, Russia is a country of tremendous concern. There's a hot war going on in Europe because of the Russian threat. And then there are other interests that we could also discuss. So, the interest of nuclear non-proliferation or the interest of regional balances of power, and so on. And so, for me, the most important issue has really been activated with China's rise to potential regional hegemon in Asia. And so, that must be the issue that the U.S. prioritizes at this point in time.
And again, the key thing that's different in Asia, relative to other regions, is that there's no other region in which a country threatens to dominate or the country doesn't have kind of a natural balancing pushback against its rise. So, because Asia both has a rival regional hegemon in the offing and does not seem to be pushing back against that, it looks like U.S. leadership is going to be really important for preventing Chinese dominance in Asia.
[00:08:57] Emma Ashford: So, we've been trying to pivot to Asia since at least the Obama administration, maybe before, and we've not particularly been able to do it. If I were to wave a magic wand and make you national security advisor today, what would you prioritize, right? You've used this term prioritization that's, kind of, in vogue at the moment. But what would be your guiding principles, two or three for U.S. foreign policy? Where would you... You obviously would focus in on Asia, but how would you, sort of, do that? What would you focus on?
[00:09:30] Jennifer Lind: Well, if we're thinking about guiding principles in U.S. foreign policy, I think I’ll first, kind of, take a step back and ask myself the big picture question that you just asked before getting to kind of specific policy prescriptions toward China. So, I think the first guiding principle is always to protect the security and prosperity of the American people and the U.S. homeland. And I think that that's something that U.S. leaders have not been as focused on as they could have been in recent years, which has led to tremendous upheaval in U.S. politics and foreign policy.
And then, secondly, I would say, when we talk about Asia and when we talk about Europe and preventing the rise of regional hegemon and such, I would say that the way I would formulate the principle for the United States is that we should use all of our tools to help our partners create a favorable balance of power in their regions. And so, that's my vision for Asia, is that there's a threat to those countries in that region and that the United States should help stabilize the balance of power, such that China does not come to dominate that region.
And then, I would say, again, this is to just really emphasize that this remains a very internationalist approach, which is another just general principle of U.S. foreign policy is to really continue to work with other countries around the world, with our partners, to mitigate the worst excesses of anarchy and to try and create a more peaceful and prosperous world, right? So, through treaties, through institutions, through alliances, to do what we can, and through a very high level of engagement.
I guess what sets that apart from some of the recent trends in U.S. foreign policy are a couple things. So, for example, the U.S. has assumed, kind of, primary responsibility for balancing in other regions. And again, maybe that's something that you can do if there's not a potential regional hegemon. But if there is a potential regional hegemon, the U.S. really can't do that alone. And so, I would prefer to formulate the principle as in these regions where our friends and partners and allies live, where they are concerned and we are concerned about regional threats. You know, we will help, you know, we will be part of the solution. We won't be the solution, while they kind of sit back. And so, I think that's the big change that we're going to need to see, given the changes in the balance of power.
[00:12:19] Emma Ashford: I think that's such an important insight. And to be frank, it's a lesson from the Cold War that I think we often forget, right? We forget how much Germany, for example, contributed to NATO in Europe during the Cold War.
So, I do want to pivot over to talking a little bit about your essay. So, your essay for the series talks mostly about progressive grand strategy, which I think is…
[00:12:42] Jennifer Lind: Yes
[00:12:42] Emma Ashford: … it's actually quite distinct from your own vision in some ways but is one of the other options on offer as Americans seek to figure out where they actually want to go in foreign policy. So, can you give us an overview of, you know, progressives, maybe the Democratic Party, however you define that group, and where they are on foreign policy questions?
[00:13:04] Jennifer Lind: Yeah. I mean, first, let me just say, as you noted, I'm not a progressive thinker. I'm not a progressive scholar. This is not my realm. And so, the reason that I am interested in it, and the reason that I wanted to write on this is I really think that having the progressive view expressed forcefully in the U.S. foreign policy debate is a really good thing for the quality and the kind of level of the foreign policy conversation that we should be having.
So, I want to see, in other words, a vibrant, cantankerous, grand strategy debate. And, you know, progressives are some of the most cantankerous folks we have. You know, they offer really important criticisms of this longstanding U.S. grand strategy. And yet, somehow, they've still been relegated to the grand strategy kids table, right? They're not playing as central a role in U.S. national security debates that they should. I want to, you know, be an ally in the sense of... I think they have really important points to make, and they're really smart folks working in this area. And so, I want them in the tent, right? I want them challenging other points of view and raising their objections and arguing hard against us.
I mean, the other thing is that the progressive grand strategy is really the only one that would not effectively react to the threat of Chinese regional hegemony. So, this is so useful to have in the debate to cure a case for a non-hawkish reaction to superpower China. I mean, at this time, Washington seems pretty unanimously hawkish, and the scholarly grand strategy conversations are pretty hawkish too, right? So, there's divides within the realist school, but generally, they're pretty hawkish. And the liberal internationalists are, you know, they've been moving toward containing China, as we've seen over the past several years.
So, so again, at a time when, basically, everyone in the debate seems pretty uniformly hawkish toward China, it's really important that we seek out alternative viewpoints. And that doesn't necessarily mean we're going to accept them, but it's really important to, kind of, test our own assumptions and arguments against other smart arguments and critiques that might be levied against them.
[00:15:33] Emma Ashford: So, I do think there's this general viewpoint that progressive grand strategy, that it's basically the anti-war left. And, you know, they're against wars. They're against wars, whether it's Vietnam, whether it's Iraq, whether it's the war on terror, more broadly. But that there's no actual grand strategy underpinning it. There's no actual broad idea of how they would approach the world. So, in your research on this, you would argue, I think, that it is broader than just anti-war reflexively.
[00:16:04] Jennifer Lind: Oh, absolutely. Yeah. I think that would be a disservice to characterize it as just sort of a, you know, we hate war and, you know... I mean, this is a grand strategy that has, I think, a pretty richly developed world that it wants to create. I think that the key factor is they are not interested in the same goals as other grand strategies, right? They have a different world in mind. For them, the key issue is, essentially, structural inequality. That's both at home in the United States — so, structural inequality within our society — but then, also, it's structural inequality in the world. And progressives see several different forces as contributing to that. And so, then they argue for, you know, dealing with those forces to mitigate that inequality. So, for example, they see authoritarianism and U.S. military power and the broader power and influence of the Global North as key factors that promote structural inequality. So, for example, the authoritarian regimes structure their politics in ways that benefit the few at the expense of the many. And the progressives also fault the United States for supporting many authoritarian regimes politically and economically. So, those are policy prescriptions focused on, again, how the U.S. should change its support for authoritarianism and for the importance of the spread of democracy, and so on.
Progressives also talk about the Global North having disproportionate power. And so, seeking reform of international institutions and, also, you know, this is pretty controversially, you know, a big wealth transfer, essentially, from the Global North to the Global South. And that would be in the form of, not just aid, but reparations for what progressives say are centuries of injustice perpetrated by the Global North against the Global South. And then also the fact, they argue the north should bear the expenses associated with mitigating climate change.
So, yeah, I mean, the other grand strategies, they’re focused much more on geopolitical balances of power, national security, military tools, and so on. And the progressives are interested in something else, right? They're interested in something beyond that. And it's really quite an ambitious vision. And it's important to say there is a vision there, right? There's, I think, a very richly developed vision there.
For me, the big question comes down to, particularly, transition, like, kind of, a question of, "Okay. Well, how do we get from this current flawed world with all the power in the Global North and so on? How do we get from this world to that world?" And I think the scholars have not laid this out in a compelling way. And then, in my paper, I addressed several other, kind of, gaps and tensions in the progressive view that, really, we would want to see more clarification about, and I, by writing this, want to encourage more debate about.
[00:19:17] Emma Ashford: It's interesting. I think a lot of grand strategies are academic grand strategies in search of a political home, but it feels a little bit like the progressive version is working backwards. There's some political base for it, but it hasn't been fully fleshed out as a program. And, you know, I think one of the tensions that you highlight there, this always struck me as, sort of, particularly problematic, is the means question, which is to say it’s a very ambitious strategy, and it seeks to change the world. And it says many of the same things as liberal internationalists do, but they're, at the same time, shooing the traditional means of power, whether that's economic coercion, whether that's military power. Again, it's a very unclear process of getting from here to there. I mean, is this an area where there really just does need to be more done to flesh this out, or are there theories of how you connect those two?
[00:20:09] Jennifer Lind: I think there's a tremendous amount of, kind of, intellectual work that needs to be done. And I don't mean by that to say, you know, it's not possible to do it or they're not capable of doing it, right? I mean, these are the people working in this area. There's some really brilliant minds. And I don't know if it's the nature of the counterculture or the actors who are important in the progressive world or the lack of kind of allies in U.S. society, and so on, but for whatever reason, the debate is, I think it's still very young. And it needs to mature before, I think, people will take it seriously.
If you compare it to the realist and liberal internationalist grand strategy debates, those are two, sort of, worldviews where, for both, there's hundreds of years of, kind of, political science theory for the liberals, you know, the enlightenment, you know. There's just generations of scholarship and people thinking about the paradigm as a whole.
And then, more recently, scholars have built... They've, kind of, stood on the shoulders of those impressive research traditions. And they've started, you know, IR scholars and people working in security studies and grand strategy have said, "Okay. Well, let's, kind of, really wrestle with some of these ideas, developing, kind of, like a core language and then, kind of, core ideas about, how does the world work and what kind of grand strategy would advance these goals, and so on?"
And when you think about it, like, the realists offer this really compelling critique, which is, or just diagnosis of the world being anarchic. And so, that’s making cooperation really difficult, fear of relative gains. Again, there's a language here, there's a canon, but the liberals, to their credit, they met this head-on, and they said, "Okay. Realists correctly diagnosed this problem of anarchy, but we think there's a way to achieve cooperation even despite that." And so, they have theories of, again, the economic and political institutions. So, we have potential for global governance, even under anarchy, right? We have economic interdependence, and so the cost of suffering valuable trade relationships will reduce war, right? We have the spread of political liberalism and said to reduce war.
So, they really engaged the realist model and created, kind of, a compelling story for how you might see cooperation. They created this concept of international order, right, and explained how countries fit into it, and so on. I mean, that's the kind of getting your hands dirty that progressives need to do, right? And I mean, they too stand on a historic body of scholarship, right? So, they can point to scholarship about Marxism, about center and periphery, right? And so, there's all these legacies of scholarship they can stand on, but they need to explain, what's their language? You know, they need to develop a language to communicate their language, to develop these models, to link them to grand strategy, and so on. And I think it can be done, but that's the task ahead.
[00:23:29] Emma Ashford: Well, this is actually, I think, a perfect point to pivot back towards your own viewpoint and maybe just talk a little about some of the tensions or distinctions between your own worldview, which I think I would be correct in categorizing as realist, to some extent, or at least based in realist principles, and, you know, these more, sort of, universalist approaches. So, you had an article in Foreign Affairs recently with Daryl Press talking about the need for prioritization in U.S. strategy. Can you talk just a little bit about that and how you think, you know, maybe it matches or conflicts with some of the other visions out there for U.S. grand strategy?
[00:24:07] Jennifer Lind: Yeah. Prioritization is essentially a strategy that we see, Daryl and I see, as existing, kind of, between the previous U.S. strategy of global leadership on the one hand and then restraint or what some people would call isolationism on the other. And so, it would be a shift in U.S. grand strategy but it's a shift that we say is necessary, given the changes in the balance of power and given the more dangerous threat environment and U.S. resources being more constrained.
And so, basically, it says the U.S. is no longer in this position of primacy. There's a changed balance of power. And certainly, you know, you and I can have a debate about multi-polarity and bi-polarity and so on, but certainly that we do face a potential regional hegemon in Asia. And so, that that is the, kind of, core problem that the U.S. needs to focus on.
And, you know, when it comes to Europe, the U.S. should remain in NATO. But that Europe must take primary responsibility for its own security. And because Europe completely outmatches Russia in terms of latent power, Europe is certainly able to do that. So, the United States does not need to remain in Europe and watch while a Chinese regional hegemon emerges in Asia.
[00:25:34] Emma Ashford: So, you know, just on the other hand then, right, how would your vision differ from that of the liberal internationalists? And not to put you on the spot, but a few years ago, you wrote a piece with William Walworth that talked about the need for, sort of, conservative internationalism. That is to say, not conservative in the political sense, but conservative in the small “c.” The U.S. should, sort of, keep what it has in terms of alliances institutions and not add any more.
But it sounds like what you're talking about with prioritization is at least somewhat more radical than that. It is a reorientation of the U.S. relationship with some parts of its existing alliance networks or partners. How would you respond to those that say that "No, the U.S. should sort of keep those alliances just as they are?"
[00:26:20] Jennifer Lind: I think that what I'm talking about and actually what… I guess I hesitate to say what the Trump administration is doing because I'm not exactly sure yet what they are doing. But for example, you do hear Trump administration officials going to Europe and saying, you know, "We're absolutely going to uphold our Article V obligations and so on." And so, neither the Trump administration nor I am talking about some, you know, wholesale pull out of NATO and so on. And so, it's much more... I conceive a bit much more as a renegotiation. And this is very common in alliances. Or I should say it's common in successful alliances, right? The alliances that don't tend to do well are the ones that don't adapt. And if there was ever a moment that required alliance adaptation, this is certainly it.
So, I see this as calling for, kind of, a renegotiation of U.S. alliances. And basically, the main one is with Europe. Because the United States faces a serious threat in Asia and because the Europeans, which of course do have a threatening regional power, but because they are more than able, given their economic and technological capabilities, they're more than able to meet that challenge with much less U.S. involvement. That just requires the Europeans to mobilize their power in a way that they have neglected for decades. So, again, U.S. is still in NATO, still should be in NATO. If there is a time when a NATO ally is attacked, the U.S. should contribute to that country's defense.
So, that's really no change. The change is that the U.S. should not be seen as the first line of defense, where it's the first to show up and it's bringing the majority of military power, because there are other demands on the United States today that we did not face in the past. And so, this is the new reality for Europe, that, you know, we need to convince our European partners, the time is now. We could say, "Well, for Asia, it doesn't require a renegotiation because we're essentially doubling down on those alliances." We're saying, "This is the region that's really important. And so, these alliances are very important, too."
But actually, there is a fair amount of updating that needs to happen there. U.S. allies have not really been balancing against China's rise, to a significant degree. And if this is a threat to their territory, which it is in some cases, it's right that they are pulling their share to balance against it. Like you mentioned before about West Germany during the Cold War, you know, the U.S. could not have contained the Soviet Union without NATO help, right? This was essential. And why on earth would we have, right? Like, if other countries adjacent to the threat are not interested in balancing against it, that creates all sorts of problems, right? So, for Asia, we need to see our partners there also stepping up more.
And the other thing is that some of these alliances need to be updated in light of the new threat environment, too. So, for example, our alliance with South Korea is undergoing some serious tension right now for a variety of reasons, partly because of the worsening North Korean nuclear threat. But the rise of China is another real source of tension in that alliance, because for the South Koreans, they want an alliance focused on North Korea, and they want to continue to essentially trade with China and sell advanced semiconductors to China and so on. But that's our primary security challenger right now. And so, this is going to be a big problem. And so, the U.S. and South Korea are going to have to also do some renegotiation of "What is our alliance about?" Because this could really create some serious problems. Like, for example, South Korea, I believe, has told the U.S. we shouldn't count remotely on the ability to use South Korean airfields in the event of a war over Taiwan.
And if that's the case, the U.S. defense of Taiwan is going to be significantly more costly, more dangerous, and lead to much higher casualties relative to if South Korea allowed the use of those bases. That's a very bad thing for the future of the relationship. If the American people think that, because of South Korea, we've lost thousands of American servicemen and women. So, this is an issue that we're going to really need to negotiate, sooner rather than later.
[00:31:08] Emma Ashford: Well, I think that's a great place to wrap up. You know, here at the Reimagining Grand Strategy Program, we're all about testing assumptions. And I think the assumption that alliances don't need to be reconfigured for new circumstances is something that comes out of your work that is really, really important.
So, I appreciate you taking the time to join me today and talk to us, not just about the progressive grand strategy, but also the prioritization question. Thank you!
[00:31:32] Jennifer Lind: Thank you so much, Emma.
[00:31:34] Emma Ashford: That's all for this episode of The Strategy Sessions. You can find the full set of episodes, along with the accompanying essays, at stimson.org or by searching for us on your favorite podcast app.
A big thanks to Stimson's communications team for their assistance with the taping and to University FM for providing audio editing services. I'm Emma Ashford. Thanks for listening!