The Strategy Sessions is a limited-run podcast hosted by Emma Ashford, a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center. Today, Emma talks with Michael Beckley, an associate professor at Tufts University and fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Emma and Michael discuss whether or not American policymakers can use multilateral institutions to the U.S.'s advantage, United States’s “declining” power, and how leaders can rightsize the U.S.'s “alliance portfolio.” Emma and Mike’s discussion is part of the New Visions for Grand Strategy Project, a collection of essays, videos, and podcasts in which out-of-the box thinkers discuss the future of U.S. foreign policy. *The Strategy Sessions Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
The Strategy Sessions is a limited-run podcast hosted by Emma Ashford, a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center. Today, Emma talks with Michael Beckley, an associate professor at Tufts University and fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Emma and Michael discuss whether or not American policymakers can use multilateral institutions to the U.S.'s advantage, United States’s “declining” power, and how leaders can rightsize the U.S.'s “alliance portfolio.”
Emma and Mike’s discussion is part of the New Visions for Grand Strategy Project, a collection of essays, videos, and podcasts in which out-of-the box thinkers discuss the future of U.S. foreign policy.
*The Strategy Sessions Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Emma Ashford: The 2020s are likely to be a pivotal decade in determining the future of America’s role in the world. Global dynamics are changing. The era of unchallenged U.S. global dominance is ending. And China and other states are rising. At home, the United States is also going through a period of transition and change in foreign policy — from bipartisan consensus to debate and division. The only thing certain is that change in U.S. foreign policy is inevitable.
In these discussions, our guests engage with some of the most challenging questions facing U.S. policymakers, bring distinct perspectives to bear on these questions, and offer their own vision for the future of U.S. grand strategy. These are The Strategy Sessions.
Hello, I'm Emma Ashford, a senior fellow in the Reimagining Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center. Welcome to The Strategy Sessions, a series of discussions with forward-looking, out-of-the-box thinkers on the future of U.S. foreign policy.
Joining me today is Michael Beckley, an associate professor at Tufts University and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Welcome!
[00:01:19] Michael Beckley: Thanks so much for having me, Emma.
[00:01:21] Emma Ashford: So, you wrote us a really interesting essay for this series. And I'm looking forward to discussing your free world that works approach. But first, I want to start with some general questions, because I think one of the more interesting things we're finding in these conversations is that many of our authors have very different visions of how they see the world that is emerging or the world that is to come. So, I guess, let me just ask you what you think the future, the emerging world order looks like. How would you differentiate it from the unipolar moment or from the Cold War period, if you do? What do you see coming down the pike?
[00:02:02] Michael Beckley: I think the biggest change from the '90s and early 2000s is just a distinct possibility of great power war. You already have Russia obviously invading Ukraine and China is engaged in the largest military buildup of any country in peacetime since Nazi Germany, and it's been getting pretty aggressive with some of its neighbors. So, you just have this situation where Russia and China are actively, explicitly using coercive methods to absorb, or at least try to absorb, some of their neighbors.
In the '90s and 2000s, I think, in the long term, they've always had fairly grandiose ambitions, but they, kind of, laid low and you've had integration economically between the United States and those two countries. Whereas, today, I think that fundamental fact that these two countries are much more willing to use coercive methods and even just straight up go to war to absorb some of their neighbors just puts us in a fundamentally different international environment and changes the situation for the United States, going forward.
[00:02:59] Emma Ashford: Yeah. So, just to drill down into this for a moment, I mean, I think I'd probably be correct in saying that what you were describing is, you know, the return of great power competition, right?
[00:03:07] Michael Beckley: So, people use that phrase. I just think it's so vague. I think it's much more specific than that, like, Russia and China are trying to absorb some of their neighbors and they’re willing to use military threats, if not outright force, to do it.
[00:03:19] Emma Ashford: Yeah. So, for you, this is less about, maybe, power trends and more about the return of revisionism?
[00:03:24] Michael Beckley: Yeah. So, I have a different view on power trends than I think maybe you do. So, I think, you know, if you look at the top 15 economies in the world, all of them, their economies are shrinking relative to America’s, except for India's which increased by, like, a quarter of a percentage point. So, it's basically holding steady. And so, it's a very different world than the so-called rise of the rest view that I think very much came into vogue in the 2000s, especially after the 2008 financial crisis and the war in Iraq and all the other disasters that really, kind of, lay the U.S. low.
And so, I look at the United States and I see it still having tremendous latent power. I think a lot of people assume the U.S. economy is, sort of, being hollowed out and that the U.S. is over-militarized. I have the exact opposite view. I look at the size of the U.S. economy, which is still about 26% of global GDP. That's been the same since, like, the 1880s and the same in the 1990s. In per capita GDP, it's even more. I mean, Americans used to be 50% less wealthy than the Japanese. Now, Americans are 140% wealthier than them.
And then just various aspects of structural economic power. The dollar is still quite dominant. You look at all the top tech firms, it's almost all entirely American, the top energy producer. I mean, there's so many examples of where the United States economically, in general, is doing well. But I look at the military area and that's where I see a lot of U.S. decline because the U.S. spread itself thin, you know, with those long-term nation building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. And U.S. defense spending, while large in aggregate, as a share of GDP, you know, it's about 3%, which I would say is a peacetime footing for the United States that has just not kept track with Russia and China, which have been radically scaling up their military. So, in relative terms, the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait or in Eastern Europe has become much more precarious, even as the global balance of latent power, I still see as very favorable to the United States.
[00:05:18] Emma Ashford: I think that's actually a great pivot into your essay because I was very struck by the line in the essay where you said the U.S. doesn't lack strength but it lacks a coherent strategy and the ability to mobilize its resources. And, you know, you've written a lot in the past, that the U.S., in many ways, remains dominant, as you say, in a lot of different sectors, or at least is in a very favorable position. But I think that the interesting thing, the core of your argument, is why the U.S. really struggles to mobilize that power. Can you talk a bit about that?
[00:05:49] Michael Beckley: Yeah. I think, ironically, a lot of the same factors that give the U.S. this flourishing economy, make it very innovative, and wealthy are the same factors that make it hard to come together, unify, and then mobilize a bunch of resources for some national undertaking, because I think these strengths and weaknesses are a function of, first, geography. The fact that the U.S. is the only great power in the Western hemisphere means we can, kind of, like, take a, sort of, laid back look at stuff going on in Eurasia and not take foreign policy so seriously. The fact that the U.S. has decentralized political institutions, you know, divided government in a federalist structure means we have a very dynamic innovative economy. But it also means there's, like, not the kind of central planning apparatus that can just pump resources into strategic industries or dial up military spending in a moment of need.
And then demographically, you know, the U.S. nation of immigrants benefits tremendously from immigrants coming in, but it also means there's a lot of churn in American society, a lot of internal division, a lot of partisan polarization that also makes it hard to have a coherent foreign policy. And you look at the U.S. government and it's like it's being lobbied by so many different groups that all want it to have a policy on everything. The tendency I see in the United States is for what you might call hollow internationalism, where it's like we have a policy on everything, we talk tough on all ranges of issues, but we don't always back it up with the big stick that you would need to actually see those things through. And that has led the United States into a number of quagmires and disasters in the past. I worry we're doing something similar, you know, but with both Russia and China today, as well as in other parts of the globe.
[00:07:24] Emma Ashford: I think, certainly, anyone that's looked at a National Security Strategy in the last decade or two would see this, sort of, you know, kitchen sink approach. We care about everything. We care about everything equally. And, you know, that's not actually how that works in practice.
I do want to push you a little bit on the military spending issue, because while you are correct that military spending has been stagnating as the economy grows, to some extent, there's also growing fiscal pressures in the United States. We see this brand-new tax bill that's just passed Congress, that's going to add trillions to the deficit, pressure to cut various entitlements, social spending. It seems like military spending should or will be the next thing on the chopping block if those trends continue. Do you actually see room for growth in the military budget?
[00:08:10] Michael Beckley: It's really tough, I mean, because it's one of the few things you could cut, because presumably, these entitlements, you know, if you're a politician, it's probably not the best move to suddenly slash those. Although, I guess that's not completely out of the question.
So, it's tough. I think you're 100% right. I think the fiscal situation in the United States is potentially leading on a road to catastrophe. The fact that interest payments on the debt are rivaling the defense budget as it currently stands. It's difficult because, I think, unless you cut some of those social programs or social spending, it's pretty much inevitable. Or raise taxes. You know, raising taxes would solve a lot of these issues. And yet, somehow, probably, for a lot of these reasons we've just discussed, you don't have the political will to unify around that, say, we need to raise funds to better make the United States resilient and powerful on the world stage at a dangerous moment. So, I totally take your point.
I think the issue I have, though, is, like, you know, in the 1960s, I think non-defense spending was about 10% of GDP and defense spending was about 10% of GDP. And now, non-defense spending is, like, I don't know, it must be, like, 30 something percent of GDP. Defense spending has gone down to 3% of GDP. I get the idea of, like, looking for ways to cut waste. You certainly don't want to be paying $500 for a hammer or whatever those ridiculous examples are, but it just seems like, at a time that Russia is waging the largest war in Europe since World War II, at a time that China is basically rehearsing blockades of Taiwan and ensconcing itself in the South China Sea and just pumping out these weapons at a rapid pace… I'm a big insurance guy. I would rather pay a little more for the insurance of having a powerful military just in case and hopefully to deter future actions than to try to cut and then assume we could always just, you know, re-up in a time of crisis. That's actually a pattern that the United States has, is to, like, wait to get punched in the face and then gear up. I'd like to avoid that, if we can, in this scenario.
[00:09:55] Emma Ashford: Yeah. We usually do a pretty good job of punching back eventually, but I agree to your point.
[00:09:59] Michael Beckley: Eventually, yeah.
[00:10:00] Emma Ashford: So, let's flip to the international environment because you also talk, your piece, I would say, doesn't necessarily defend the liberal international order in the way that, perhaps, some of the Biden administration people might have. It's not about rules-based order. But you argue that this liberal order was once successful, but it has shifted. It has become something different. Can you elaborate a bit on why you don't see this necessarily as a source of strength anymore or why it needs change to be a source of strength?
[00:10:31] Michael Beckley: Yeah. For me, this is another one of these ironies in foreign policy where I think a lot of the issues with the liberal order, ironically, are problems of success. So, I think the liberal order did a very good job pacifying Germany and Japan and other European, Eurasian powers and bringing them into this Western alliance. But now, a lot of American allies can't really bear major burdens. So, even though I'm not a huge JD Vance fan, I had a lot of sympathy when people were saying, “Why can't the Europeans, like, take care of the Houthis? Why does America…” you know. So, in other words, the allies, by being pacified, are no longer really bearing burdens. Or, you know, the idea of bringing Russia and China and other autocratic regimes into this open trading order, I think, made a lot of sense. You know, you want to try to make them responsible stakeholders, but it seems like they basically… they became a Trojan horse. You know, China, which is the country I know the best, has looted the system in all various ways to make itself more powerful while never really opening up.
And so, that openness, which was such an advantage during the Cold War, having this flourishing open capitalist system within the Western alliance, I think, in a globalized system, is actually a disadvantage because our adversaries can use it against us. I think just the expansion in the number of nation states. You know, like, the decolonization is a wonderful thing, the fact that the number of countries in the world triples or, I think, even quadruples since World War II, all wonderful. But it then means that things like the UN, the world, all these international institutions at the United States originally led and created to try to orchestrate the world, it's like trying to do a group project with, like, 200 people and everyone has a veto. And so, they've really become paralyzed over time.
And then the final thing is just, domestically, I mean, I think different regions of the United States, some have benefited a lot from a globalized trade, interdependent system, others have been completely hollowed out as multinational companies, you know, move, outsource jobs, et cetera. And that has then catalyzed political polarization, economic inequality within the U.S. and, kind of, weakened it from within.
So, I think, you know, liberal order, good job containing communism and slaying the Soviet Union. Good job pacifying Germany and Japan. These are all amazing miracles that have happened. But for the kind of world we're living in now with state capitalist adversaries with allies that are too pacified to bear burdens and with a hollowed out middle of the American economy, I think, it's in need of serious revision and trimming, is the point I try to make in the essay.
[00:12:53] Emma Ashford: Do you draw any distinctions between alliances — US alliances — and some of these multilateral institutions? Because, you know, I can very much see that argument when it comes to some of the UN agencies, for example, that, you know, the U.S. has been bound by some rules that really aren't necessarily in its interests and we have to figure out a way to, maybe, work within a more appropriate coalition. But I also see that problem in U.S. alliances, right? NATO is now so sprawling and large that it's, kind of, hard to get consensus on things. Do you think of those both as parts of the system that need reform or do you see a difference?
[00:13:31] Michael Beckley: I do. I think the alliances are the ones that I want to reform and retain. Whereas, some of these multilateral institutions, I think, if anything, they become arenas for anti-American posturing and funding groups that are, like, straight up anti-American. So, with the alliances, I think NATO, that's a great example that you just gave. You know, the U.S. in the '90s and early 2000s doubled the number of members while cutting the number of U.S. troops in Europe by half, and then trying to tell all of its NATO partners to focus on counter-terrorism. And now, the United States is looking at NATO partners, saying, “Why can't you handle Russia?” And I think they have a point of saying, “Well, look, like, you know, you increased the interests that we have to defend, but you took out your power. And, you know, we're going to cash a piece dividend as well.” And so, it's just ended up with another one of these hollow internationalist projects. I don't think it's unsolvable, but, you know, when Donald Trump is, like, excoriating NATO members, I think the guy has a point.
[00:14:24] Emma Ashford: Yeah. I'm struck again by how, in many ways, your diagnosis of the problem, I think, mirrors that of some of the folks, you know, the prioritizers, let's say, right? You see that the U.S. is overextended in some way or not committing resources to the strategy that we have. There's a mismatch there that current institutions aren't quite working for us. Your solutions are radically different, at least as I see them. So, you know, instead of reorienting from Europe to the Indo-Pacific and burden-shading in Europe, which I think is where some of this administration is on this question, you start to talk about burden shifting in terms of allies who contribute stay under the American security umbrella, and those who don't, don’t. That seems to me to be a very different proposition.
[00:15:08] Michael Beckley: Yeah. I mean, ideally, I think I would probably share some of the perspectives of the prioritizers because, as an Asia person, I tend to think of Asia first, and I think China is just much more of a threat than Russia is.
That said, you know, when Russia is launching this massive war and continuing to mobilize more troops, seems like an odd time to me, anyway, of, let's pull back from Europe and just assume the Europeans are going to be able to stand up. I think the idea of tough love and really showing them that they have to eventually step up and basically take the lead here is right, but to just pull the rug out, which I don't know if anyone, you know, in the prioritizer camp advocates, but that's what I would be wary of. In other words, I don't think it can just be an immediate shift to Asia first. Although, I agree, in the long term, we need a much stronger set of European partners to really hold the line there so that more of American resources can go to Asia.
[00:15:54] Emma Ashford: Yeah. And that has always been the classic problem, right? Is, how do you incentivize that burden-shifting without some sort of threat of pullback? And I think that's one of the problems the administration is wrestling with at the moment. And, you know, I think restrainers and realists have been wrestling with it for a very long time. So, not sure how solvable it is.
[00:16:13] Michael Beckley: I’m a big fan of tough love. You know, the Trump administration has shown that… because, you know, it’s not like they're demanding things that were that radically different from, say, the Obama administration. Every American president has fumed about the free riding going on among allies. But the fact that they were willing to make threats has seemingly galvanized at least some increase in military investment in Europe. And so, I think that illustrates your point, that there has to be a credible threat of exit. Otherwise, it just doesn't really sound the alarm bells.
[00:16:42] Emma Ashford: There's definitely something Trumpian about the way you talk about tough love and, sort of, pushing allies to shape up. And in particular, I think the way in which you link economics and security together, right? Not just that, you know, economic strength builds military power, but also that, you know, the U.S. can use tariffs and sanctions as tools to get allies to do more, that they can incentivize them by giving market access as a carrot. This seems like it would be a way that, you know, maybe some allies will shape up, but it also seems like it might drive some allies away.
[00:17:19] Michael Beckley: I'm not so much worried of them openly siding with Russia or China because, in most cases, they're much more afraid of Russia and China than they are of the United States. Like, I can't see Japan just suddenly, like, trying to buddy up with the Chinese or, you know, Western Europeans siding with Russia over their Eastern European neighbors. But I do think you're right, that they might hedge, you know, they might just basically become neutral and just extract benefits from both sides. I'm, sort of, banking on the fact that the U.S., I think, can offer a lot more to these countries. One, the protection of a giant superpower. Second, the U.S. consumer market, which is as big as the Eurozone in China's combined. And I think, for demographic reasons, it's going to become even more dominant in the future.
And then tech and capital markets, I mean, the U.S. just has a lot of cards to play that it can offer to countries that hopefully will get them to side. And just frankly, I think, at the end of the day, there is something to be said for the values and institutions that the United States shares with a lot of these countries in Western Europe, in the first island chain of East Asia, that just inherently breed more trust among those countries. I'm pretty sure the political science literature bears that out, that it does help solidify some of these bonds. So, that's, sort of, what I'm banking on here. But I mean, I think you're right. Like, I could see Singapore, you know. But at the end of the day, I feel like those countries have been hedging already. Big parts of South America. You know, I'll be happy if they just stay neutral, frankly, if there's a great power competition going. And I would expect them to try to extract benefits from both sides. I just am not so worried because I don't see them as the key geostrategic players for the United States and trying to contain China and Russia, going forward.
[00:18:53] Emma Ashford: Are there any countries, any allies that you think, sort of, are critical? Because I think a lot of people working on this start from, you know, the most important strategic allies and interests and then work into the burden sharing part. But if you start with, are they sharing the burden, it may not necessarily be the most strategic allies that stick with you or pull away. Is there any country you would be worried about if they were to pull away from the U.S.?
[00:19:20] Michael Beckley: I would first look at the economies, because I think, for a long-term competition, I think that was a huge advantage the United States had over the Soviet Union. It's like, you know, when you're picking teams for, like, sports on recess, it's like, okay, so, you know, the Soviets get to pick, you know, its motley crew of partners and America's like, we'll take Japan, we'll take West Germany, we'll take the UK. You know, we get really strong, excellent partners. And I think that remains true today.
I mean, just Western Europe and the first island chain in East Asia and North America, that's more than half of global GDP right there. And so, if you're able to create another flourishing coalition where you're trading with each other, investing, and building resilient supply chains and military cooperation, that's a powerful collective bargaining mechanism that you can then deploy against adversaries and third parties. So, you know, I worry a lot about Japan. I worry about the UK, the big ones that you would assume that are, kind of, like, the G7 nations. And then, at the same time, there are countries like Ukraine or Taiwan, which are on the front lines of this conflict. They're not necessarily official U.S. allies. But if those kind of countries just start to fold, I don't know if these things can build up a momentum of their own. I would hate a world where, you know, Taiwan just knuckles under and the Chinese now have that ability to start projecting power further out. I have a very dim view of their ambitions in the long term.
[00:20:37] Emma Ashford: So, your strategy basically relies on, sort of, using allies as, kind of, amplifiers for U.S. power, instead of dependents, which I think is the language that you use. And I think, you know, we can all agree, I think that would be definitely a better place. In terms of, sort of, getting from here to there, because this is a question I've wrestled with a lot, too, do you think there are any credibility concerns, credibility being the Washington word we hear bandied about a lot? But getting from these massive sprawling alliances and institutions down to something leaner and meaner, do you think that's a process that we can manage adequately?
[00:21:17] Michael Beckley: I’m not so sure. I mean, I think that's going to take a lot of deft diplomacy. I actually think, you know, foreign policy is kind of what happens when you're making other plans, too. I mean, we can draft, like, you know, a bunch of think tank glossy proposals about how the U.S. should right-size its alliance portfolio and meanwhile, like, some conflict will break out, that just radical... I mean, the Ukraine War's a perfect example. I think that has radically changed debates about alliances in Europe in a way that, you know, would not exist without it.
So, I think establishing principles that the U.S. is looking for in terms of what it needs from its partners, thinking very strategically about what the U.S. role should be, you know, getting away from an idea of the U.S. needs to be, like, globo cop and just going in guns hot everywhere all the time and thinking more like a quarterback kind of role, where it's like there's a sort of division of labor here. You know, there are frontline states that are actively resisting these countries. Maybe we should transfer some arms to them. Then there are regional powers that can do a lot of the, sort of, intermediate range kind of kinetic activity if there's, like, a war. And then you have the U.S. which has certain assets that only really the U.S. can do, you know, in terms of the satellite intelligence and the targeting, the heavy lift, the logistics. And then ultimately, if absolutely necessarily, long-range strike. I mean, you can see this sort of natural division of labor opening up. And yet, I don't think we think strategically enough about how to do that in these particular hotspots around Eurasia.
[00:22:41] Emma Ashford: Yeah. To some extent, I think, because we have shifted into the Trump administration where there are a number of people, you know, doing the division of labor on a geographical basis, right, so, U.S. in the Indo-Pacific, Europeans in Europe, you know, we've, sort of, shifted away from, I think, the more Biden era conversation about division of labor in terms of capabilities.
[00:22:59] Michael Beckley: Yeah, I think so. And I do have tremendous respect and sympathy for folks that say, “Look, you know, that's all well and good. You can have this division of labor. It's not going to work in practice.” And that America needs to be able to just go it alone if it absolutely has to, something like the hellscape, you know, that Admiral Samuel Paparo wants to set up in case China tries to invade Taiwan, he definitely wants that to be able to be set up even if Japan and other allies don't allow access to their territory and don't participate in the war because you would never want to be so strategically dependent.
So, I get that argument, but I think, if we're in the realm of planning for what would be the best case scenario and what should be the goal that we're at least moving towards, you can always hedge and have a backup plan that's, like, if you got to go it alone you do. But it seems like, you know, we have a lot of opportunities to orchestrate something that would be better and really present Russia and China with a much more united front.
[00:23:49] Emma Ashford: So, before we wrap up, I have a couple more general questions that I want to, sort of, come back to. And I think the first of them really is, you know, all of the essays in the series are talking about what they think the best approach for the U.S. in the world is. If I could just get you to boil it down to, sort of, three or four principles that you think are the most important things for the United States in the next couple of decades, what would you focus on?
[00:24:15] Michael Beckley: I think one is self-reliance. And that doesn't mean autarky. Like, I think it's inexcusable that the United States is entirely reliant on rare earths and magnets coming out of China. I mean, that is a massive Achilles’ heel. So, those kinds of gaps where life necessities are coming directly from our chief rival, that just seems like a very bad thing. So, plugging those holes, I think, first and foremost, which actually may mean working more with some of your allies to try to have your own resilient supply chains. I think that needs to be a principle.
I think second is remembering… like, kind of, appreciating what has already been accomplished. Like, I think sometimes we take… it's easy to rip on the European Union, you know, for all manner of reasons, right. But the European Union is, sort of, a miracle, you know, when you think about it in terms of the broad sweep of European history. Or Germany and Japan, the first island chain in East Asia, I mean, these were all areas that were just completely war-torn, in many cases impoverished. And now, they've been largely turned into zones of peace and prosperity and largely liberal and democratic. I think that doesn't just happen, you know. And so, we have to be cognizant that we haven't lost everything yet. There is a lot that is worth standing up for.
And then I think, finally, just in terms of the calibration of your interests. I think the U.S. should recognize that it has a lot of tools to play. Again, I think this gets into the long-term assessment of the balance of power. I mean, so much that has come out, especially from scholars, is, like, the U.S. is basically done for and should essentially continually scale back its interests. I'm not totally against trying to have a more limited set of interests, but it just seems like the U.S. has more tools to play than just pull back and retrench or, like, wage, a preventive war. There's all these other tools of influence to, kind of, shape and shove, you know, around Eurasia in ways that, I think, long-term will be better. It's kind of like an insurance policy. I'd rather pay a little extra to try to get out ahead of the problem rather than doing what the U.S. usually does, which again is this very reactive approach. Like, waiting for some threat to get critical and then usually overreacting once you get punched in the face. I mean, there's just so many examples of that. I mean, I look at, like, in 1990 with Saddam Hussein, and the U.S. kind of gives him, like, a yellow light. You know, it doesn't really tell him, don't invade Kuwait.
But then when he does, the U.S. intervenes massively. And then we have this huge troop presence in the Middle East that inflames Al-Qaeda. Then they attack. And then the U.S., you know, goes into this quagmire in Iraq and Afghanistan. Or, you know, with Korea, we don't really tell the North Koreans. We pull our troops out and take it out of our defense perimeter. They attack. Then we intervene anyway. And it, you know, inflames the situation, I think, that leads eventually to something like Vietnam as we worry that communists are on the march. So, in other words, nipping problems in the bud. Being proactive rather than reactive is another principle that I would hope would be inculcated in U.S. strategy.
[00:27:00] Emma Ashford: I think that's a really good summary. So, last question, little out of the box. Here at Stimson in our program, we love questioning assumptions about foreign policy, defense policy. So, let me ask you, what's one assumption that U.S. foreign policy that you think we should question?
[00:27:17] Michael Beckley: I mean, I think the one that I'll just beat into the ground is the idea that U.S. latent power is declining rapidly. I mean, I think a lot of the statistics I try to put out in the piece and when I'm looking ahead at the longer term trends, economically, I see the U.S. economy as being this incredibly flourishing, really strong force internationally. It's going to become this huge market, and it leads in a lot of technology. And so, it's a question of trying to use those resources wisely, both to make sure that the U.S. is whole internally and that you don't have these horrible domestic divisions and inequalities.
But also, to realize that, internationally, if the U.S. puts its mind to something, it has a lot of resources that it could bring to bear. And so, it's more a question of, what are our priorities and how can we focus attention on them and then mobilize the necessary resources to back up whatever demands we're making with an actual stick that adversaries will fear and that allies will trust. Because if we're not doing that, then we're just, sort of, picking fights that we can't actually win. And that's, sort of, the worst case scenario.
So, I think getting away from the just straight up doom and gloom, being real about America's deficiencies but not just assuming that the U.S. is kind of falling back into one among just many, sort of, relatively equal poles and realizing that the U.S. has a lot of cards to play. I think it's just very important for both strategy as well as just an academic, too. I just think it leads to more fascinating ideas because it's like people assume that the threats the U.S. faces is this series of rising powers and that the key challenge for the U.S. is how do you, like, hand off power and manage this multipolar environment?
I actually see an entropic situation where, like, a lot of these traditional great powers are, for demographic reasons, for debt reasons, et cetera, are going to be increasingly hollowed out. And that leads to threats like irredentism, like what you were seeing with Russia and Ukraine. In the developing world, it leads to problems like state failure. I mean, a lot of countries around the so-called Global South are already in massive debt distress. They have no ability to provide enough jobs for their booming populations. I think that's going to trigger waves of state failure and migration. I mean, these are the, kind of, threats that we need to be cognizant of. And I think it only happens when you look at the trends and the balance of power in a way that's not just rise of the rest and, you know, multipolarity. But I know you've written an eloquent book that takes issue, I think, with some of these facts. And so, I look forward to debating and discussing and reading so much more of what you write.
[00:29:41] Emma Ashford: No., I mean, I think that's a great assumption. And to be frank, if I could frame it in a slightly different way, I think one of the things you're saying there is, even as we're back in this era of great power competition, whatever we want to call it, we should also be thinking about there are transnational trends like demographics, things like that, that could actually be the threats that we care about two decades from now. So, with a slightly broader lens, we should keep that in mind. So, look, I really appreciate you taking the time to chat with me today and to sort of make the full throated case for American power. So, thanks so much.
[00:30:14] Michael Beckley: Thanks so much for having me, Emma. You're a really gracious host, so I appreciate it.
[00:30:22] Emma Ashford: That's all for this episode of The Strategy Sessions. You can find the full set of episodes, along with the accompanying essays, at stimson.org or by searching for us on your favorite podcast app. A big thanks to Stimson's communications team for their assistance with the taping and to University FM for providing audio editing services. I'm Emma Ashford. Thanks for listening!