The Strategy Sessions is a limited-run podcast series hosted by Emma Ashford, a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center. Emma talks with Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute about alliances, multipolarity, and the future of U.S. foreign policy, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific. Emma and Zack’s discussion is part of the New Visions for Grand Strategy Project, a collection of essays, videos, and podcasts in which out-of-the box thinkers discuss the future of U.S. foreign policy. *The Strategy Sessions Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
The Strategy Sessions is a limited-run podcast series hosted by Emma Ashford, a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center. Emma talks with Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute about alliances, multipolarity, and the future of U.S. foreign policy, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific.
Emma and Zack’s discussion is part of the New Visions for Grand Strategy Project, a collection of essays, videos, and podcasts in which out-of-the box thinkers discuss the future of U.S. foreign policy.
*The Strategy Sessions Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Emma Ashford: The 2020s are likely to be a pivotal decade in determining the future of America’s role in the world. Global dynamics are changing. The era of unchallenged U.S. global dominance is ending. And China and other states are rising. At home, the United States is also going through a period of transition and change in foreign policy — from bipartisan consensus, to debate and division. The only thing certain is that change in U.S. foreign policy is inevitable.
In these discussions, our guests engage with some of the most challenging questions facing U.S. policymakers, bring distinct perspectives to bear on these questions, and offer their own vision for the future of U.S. grand strategy. These are the strategy sessions.
Hello, I'm Emma Ashford, the senior fellow in the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center. Welcome to The Strategy Sessions, a series of discussions with forward-looking out-of-the-box thinkers on the future of U.S. Grand Strategy.
Joining us today is Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and a lecturer at Princeton University.
Welcome, Zack!
[00:01:19] Zack Cooper: Thanks, Emma. Delighted to be here.
[00:01:20] Emma Ashford: So, as you know, these discussions are covering a wide range of ground, but I want to start with some general questions about how you see U.S. foreign policy. And I think, in particular, I wanted to ask you how you see the world that is emerging, right? I think we all, at this point, know that we're moving past the unipolar moment or the post-Cold War moment. But I'm curious how you see the world that's emerging, what differentiates it from the last 30 years or even the period before that. What's your take?
[00:01:51] Zack Cooper: So, I've tried to describe this as a world of fragmented multipolarity. And the reason I think it's multipolar is because we're seeing the rise of a number of powers, whether it's China or India, a more independent Europe, a number of rising powers, whether they're Brazil or Indonesia, along with a lot of existing powers that, I think, are, in some degree, of relative decline. I would put the U.S. in that category, but probably Japan and a handful of others as well.
And so, I think, when you look at the world, it is multipolar and it's getting more so by the year. But at the same time, it's very fragmented. If you look at the security architecture in Europe, it looks almost unipolar. I barely think that Russia counts as a pole at this point. If you look at the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, it’s pretty clearly bipolar at this moment. And then, if you look elsewhere, maybe in Africa or Latin America or the Middle East, it looks more multipolar to me.
So, I think the world is becoming more multipolar. But also, it's fragmented based on the issue sets that we're looking at and the regions that we're looking at. And I think this is just much more complex than anything we've dealt with. I mean, for most of my lifetime, we either had the bipolar Cold War order, or we had the unipolar moment, and now we have something which is just incredibly messy. And I think it's part of why those of us in Washington have had a hard time getting our hands around what this world looks like right now and what it's going to look like in the future.
[00:03:28] Emma Ashford: So, I think one of the common arguments against multipolarity is this notion that there's still, you know, maybe in the Taiwan Strait, China could challenge the U.S. militarily, but elsewhere there is still no other power that really can challenge the U.S. in the military space. But as you're saying, across domains, that looks quite different. I mean, do you think that's going to persist? Or is this something where the military edge is going to follow some of these other indicators?
[00:03:57] Zack Cooper: So, I think the military dynamic has, in many ways, changed less than some of the other areas, right? I mean, look around the world at the top trading partners, and you'll see that the U.S. had a huge number of countries with which it was their top trading partner for years. And China has supplanted us with most of those countries. And the U.S. is going down that list quickly, as we put tariffs on everyone, including our closest allies and partners.
If you look at the technology sphere, however, I think that tends to be an area where, actually, the U.S. still has a significant lead. China's certainly catching up, but not yet nearly as advanced in many areas as the United States.
So, I think it's varied across all these issues sets. The one thing I'd say on the military side is there's a question of both how capable the U.S. military is. And I agree. Our dominance has been challenged in East Asia. I don't think we have primacy anymore. I don't think we've had primacy for quite some time in East Asia. That doesn't mean that we're not the most dominant player elsewhere in the world, but I also think we have to acknowledge that the American people aren't so sure why we should play this dominant role everywhere. And they're, therefore, questioning the logic of American engagement. And I think, over time, in both the Republican and the Democratic parties, that's going to lead towards this push for some degree of prioritization. And so, even if today we still have a significant edge over most of our competitors, I think, in certain areas, that may erode over time.
[00:05:33] Emma Ashford: Yeah. So, this is, I think, actually, a really good setup to the next big question, which is, if you see us emerging into this fragmented multipolar world, what role do you envisage for the U.S. in this world? And you could answer this one of two ways, right? You could say what you think we should be doing or where you suspect we might end up. And those might not be the same.
[00:05:54] Zack Cooper: Yeah. Boy, I think what we should be doing is making some really difficult strategic choices. And I think we're not doing that yet. You know, we have a Trump administration now, which, I heard from many of my friends in the current administration, was going to really execute the Pivot to Asia. They were going to focus on China.
The one thing we've seen so far is a shift of forces towards the Middle East, which is precisely what everyone told us wasn't going to happen under President Trump, at least in the second term. And so, that's actually a similar story to what we've heard from the Biden administration, from the first Trump administration, from the Obama administration. So, we often say that we're going to make these tough choices, but at the end of the day, we're not actually structured to do this. And I think part of the reason is, let's be honest, as a strategic community, we've been able to get away without having to make really tough choices for a very long time because we've just been so powerful. And I think, now, we're seeing that both the American people want us to make some decisions about where we're going to spend our resources, but also the strategic circumstances dictate this. And yet, as strategic thinkers, we are having a hard time doing this. And I think that's the challenge before us, and that's part of why I think this project you're doing is so important.
[00:07:17] Emma Ashford: I was going to ask you next, if you were going to design U.S. foreign policy for the future, what would be your guiding principles? Two or three things. I mean, it sounds like you're saying that prioritization and hard choices is one of those guiding principles, but anything else that you would throw in there for policymakers?
[00:07:33] Zack Cooper: Yeah. As you know, I'm a big believer in the power of alliances and partnerships. I think they magnify our power when they're handled properly. I think, therefore, the investment of resources in Europe and Asia is still warranted. If we are smart about how we work with our allies in NATO, with our treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific, and a number of our partners, I think they magnify American power and they help us pursue American interests.
So, my view is we can prioritize but we shouldn't think of this in a binary way. A little bit of effort, I think, by the United States and Europe can go a really long way, both for maintaining European security, but also for, let's be very blunt, maintaining some degree of American control over what happens in a part of the world that we think is really important. And let's be honest, that was part of the logic of why we built these alliances in the first place after the second World War.
I think the area where we still have a lot of resources invested, which has a harder argument, is the Middle East. And you've written very thoughtfully about this for years. Initially, when Americans talked about our commitment to the Middle East, part of the reason was we needed the Middle East for energy resources. This is changing, right? We've become more and more energy independent, a huge exporter on the global market. And at the end of the day, that means that the Middle East, strategically, is just not as important as it used to be.
So, if it were me and I was having to make hard decisions about the areas of the world where maybe we don't get quite as much return on our investment, I think, if I had to compare Europe and Asia and the Middle East, the Middle East would probably be the area that I would look to pull back to some degree. I'm not saying I would get out entirely, but I think we are going to have to trim our engagement there over time.
[00:09:30] Emma Ashford: Yeah. I mean, something I'm always just struck by is, I think, it was during his first campaign, was Donald Trump, the person who didn't know anything about foreign policy and still really doesn't, but he was the one who said, “Oh, we're just in the Middle East defending China's oil,” which is a one-sentence distillation of a strategic reality that Washington doesn't quite seem to grasp yet. It's fascinating.
I do want to drill down into the alliances question, though, because your paper for this project and a lot of your work recently has focused on questions of coalition building in multipolarity, whether the U.S. can do this. So, I guess, let's start with the basics, right? Do coalitions in multipolarity look different than they do in other systems?
[00:10:12] Zack Cooper: I think the answer is yes. And the main difference is that, in a bipolar system, the kinds of alliances you get tend to be really, really strong and almost fixed, right? And you know this well as an international relations theorist, right? There's all of this research that suggests that bipolar systems tend to be stable in some ways because you know who the main protagonists are. They don't change overnight. And so, these alliances basically form, and they tend to continue for many, many years. Of course, our alliances changed significantly across the Cold War, but there was a lot of continuity.
In a multipolar system, what you tend to get is changing groups of countries that are aligned on different issue sets. And this is part of what I think we're having a very hard time with right now. We have alliances, and I don't think we should get rid of those alliances, but we also now have these groupings of countries, some of which aren't allies. And we need to work with them very closely.
My view is that the way to think about this is that every coalition that we build should have a very clear focus and an objective. And the countries that are part of that coalition should be built around that objective. And if they can contribute to it, great. If they can't, they shouldn't be in it. Which means more countries is not better. In fact, more countries can slow down progress towards a very specific goal. They can water down what that coalition can do.
Now, I think the Trump administration, in some ways, they understand this. The Quad, for example, they just put out a statement that said that they need to have a much more focused group that can deliver results. And that's basically right in my mind.
Now, NATO, for example, I think the Trump team is trying very hard to get NATO to focus on one thing, which is the defense capabilities needed to deter Russia effectively. I think some of our other mini lateral groupings have become a bit amorphous, frankly. And I don't think that those are necessarily fit for purpose.
I'll just say one bit of good news here, which is I'm not sure that our competitors have groupings that are fit for purpose, either. I can't think of a group that is less aligned on big strategic issues and interests than the expanded BRICS coalition. And so, I don't think the U.S. has this right today, but I don't think China and Russia do, either.
[00:12:38] Emma Ashford: Shanghai Cooperation Organization might give it a run for its money. But, you know, I want to come back to that point later because I think we're going to talk a little bit about competing coalitions in the Indo-Pacific. But let's talk for just a minute about whether this sort of flexible coalition building is something that the U.S. can do, because I often struggle with this notion that we need to keep every alliance we have and then build new ones that are fit for purpose. And in one case, whether that's even possible, right? Because it's just too much. So, that's one question or problem with it. But on the other hand, I wonder because sometimes I see people looking at things like the Quad and trying to say, “Well, how can we make those more like NATO? Or how can we bring together our Indo-Pacific Alliances and our European alliances so that they're more interoperable and work closer together?” And I wonder if the U.S. is just capable of doing this or if we’ve become so used to rigid bureaucratized alliances.
[00:13:41] Zack Cooper: Yeah, I think you're right that rigidity in alliance relationships can be advantageous. It can be reassuring to the allies. But it's also not what you need when you're trying to build a flexible group of coalitions, right? Coalitions should come together for a purpose. Once they achieve that objective, they may go away. And I think that's fine.
I think part of the challenge we have right now is, often, when American leaders want to go make a big announcement, they think, “Okay, well let's add countries to this group. Let's add missions to this group.” I actually think that's exactly the wrong idea. And getting back to a very realistic focus on deliverables, I think, is the only way forward.
Now, that's going to mean that, probably, some alliances that don't deliver are going to be in question. I'll give you one, which is the U.S.-Thai Alliance, right? Boy, if you look at polls in Thailand, the Thai leadership, the expert community increasingly sees the U.S. as more of a threat than an ally. I don't think that's a foundation for long-term success in any alliance.
But you mentioned the Quad, right? I think the Quad can do a lot. It's a grouping of countries that are all willing to balance against China in certain areas. But when the Quad tries to do other things outside of that remit, I think, often, it's struggled. And so, we've just got to be ruthless, I think, in trying to direct these groupings that we're building. And if those groupings aren't delivering, then, frankly, I think senior leadership should acknowledge that and either withdraw or try and change the groupings to be ones that can deliver specific results.
[00:15:26] Emma Ashford: So, a question that comes up a lot here is whether the United States, particularly, in the era of Donald Trump, is a reliable enough partner for other states to want to trust it. And I think we've seen a lot of these cases recently where states are basically saying, “Well, you know, the U.S. said one thing on Afghanistan, and then the withdrawal was so sudden we didn't expect it. Or, the Trump administration the first time around wanted burden sharing, but didn't do much about it. Biden said, ‘No, no, no.’ You know, the U.S. is back, and now Trump is back and it's back to burden sharing. And so, you're so unreliable. We can't actually build a strategy around the U.S.” Is this accurate as a criticism?
[00:16:09] Zack Cooper: I do think it's accurate. I don't think it means that we can't build coalitions and keep alliances alive, but I think it makes it harder. And the madman theory, this idea that being unpredictable is good. Theoretically, it's true that being unpredictable with adversaries makes them maybe give you more room because they're less confident that, if they test you, that they know what you'll do. The challenge, as you noted, is that, when you do that with allies, it makes them more cautious about aligning with you. It may make them step up and spend more money on defense, but it doesn't mean that they're spending money on the things you want them to spend it on. They may be duplicating capabilities that the U.S. brought to bear previously because they are not sure if they can count on Washington.
But I do think there's a set of countries that don't have exit options. In other words, if the U.S. isn't there, they don't have another choice of who to rely on. I'll give you an example, which is, if you're the Philippines, if the U.S. doesn't support the Philippines, the Philippines is going to have to make some pretty drastic changes to its foreign policy. And so, I don't think you'll see the Philippines or Japan or Australia fundamentally changing their foreign policy and de-aligning from the United States. I do think that they're going to be taking some actions that make them somewhat less reliant. But I think we're still hugely important. And there's a great poll that just came out a few days ago, which basically demonstrated that, if you ask in South Korea, in Japan, who their key ally is, the answer is still the United States. Yes, you get more people that also say that the U.S. is one of the greatest threats to those countries, but at the end of the day, they still want Washington to be deeply engaged. And they're willing to accept some of that friction as the cost of doing business.
[00:17:57] Emma Ashford: So, one of the things that comes up a lot, and you mentioned this earlier in the conversations about multipolarity, is that it's not like bipolarity where a lot of states don't have this choice, but that many states now do have more choice. So, you gave a couple of examples of states where aligning with the U.S. just remains a very obvious position. Are there states that fall into that other category that give you concern?
[00:18:20] Zack Cooper: There are a lot of states that I think don't want to broadly align with the U.S. I think India is a good example in the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia is another good example. They have real frustrations with Washington, concerns about some U.S. policies. And yet, there are areas where they will align with us.
And I think this is why, if you are thinking of the world in terms of a bipolar world in which you're either aligned with the U.S. or aligned with China, a lot of policymakers in Washington are going to be disappointed because most countries don't want to clearly align with the U.S. against China. But they might work with the U.S. very closely in a coalition on critical minerals. And at the end of the day, isn't that really what we're asking them to do, is work with us on a specific objective? That's why I'm a little bit more positive about our ability to operate effectively. But we have to acknowledge, this is a much more complex world which is going to require a lot from the policy makers who are trying to execute the strategy. They're going to have to know these countries well. They're going to have to engage at different times with different leaders on different opportunities, functional or regional. And boy, it's going to be so much more complex than just going to a NATO Summit and trying to do all of your business at one big meeting with all of Europe. This is about creating different groups on different issues and seizing the moment when those countries might be willing to really press ahead on a specific issue set.
[00:19:45] Emma Ashford: Yeah, and potentially with some issue areas where you might end up with conflict, I'm thinking of things like Turkey wanting to buy F-35s and also Russian S-400s, that there are definitely going to be places where you might have to draw a line with some countries.
[00:20:01] Zack Cooper: And I think most countries inherently, when they have to make decisions like that, are going to accept that there's some risks to working with the U.S. And that's been clear before Donald Trump also, right? But I think it's particularly clear now that the U.S. may be a little bit less dependable than we used to be, but also there's some value to them in working in areas where our interests are aligned. And so, an old mentor of mine used to say, when we have alliances with countries, this is not done out of generosity on America's behalf. And I think sometimes we've made a mistake in Washington in trying to tell our foreign partners that, “Look, we're doing this to help you out.” No, we're doing this because it's in our interest and it helps us and it also happens to help you. But that's really where I think there are opportunities. And so, I think being a little bit more honest sometimes about that reality would help reassure countries, “We're not doing this to be benevolent. We're doing this because it's in our own distinct interest.”
[00:21:02] Emma Ashford: Yeah. So, I want to come back to the, let's just say to the authoritarian side of this problem or the competitors' side of this problem, because you said something that I think I've heard quite a lot about in Washington, which is, the U.S. has these networks of alliances, they’re our greatest strength, and China cannot replicate that success. But I've also seen China very successfully working with a variety of states in the way that you're describing, right? If you go out to the Gulf, you'll see Chinese EVs everywhere and Chinese construction companies are building a bunch of these new mega developments. And China seems very willing to work with states on specific issues in a flexible way. Are we, maybe, underestimating the Chinese ability to build coalitions or alliances?
[00:21:50] Zack Cooper: I think you're right, that the Chinese have been quite effective at building these more amorphous groups and relationships that may be issue-specific but are really important to the countries that are involved. And, you know, a lot of us pooh-pooh the Belt and Road Initiative, but it's been really important to a lot of countries in Africa and Latin America and Southeast Asia. So, I think China has some real strengths in this area. Part of the reason is they didn't have an option to create major brand-new alliances because the U.S. had, sort of… it's like if we played a pickup basketball game and we got to choose our partners first, out of the top 20 economies, we got to choose about 12, 13. And a lot of those are the more stable countries that we got to pick.
And so, if you're China, well, if you've already lost the advanced industrial economies in Europe and Asia, where else do you turn? You can turn to the Middle East, you can turn to Africa, you can turn to Latin America and Southeast Asia. And that's what they've done. And those relationships look very different from our fixed alliances.
So, I think you're right, that Beijing has probably been more capable in this area than people thought. I also believe, however, that Chinese leaders are often not particularly adept at listening to what domestic populations want in the countries that they're dealing with. And some of this is that the Chinese system doesn't always train their diplomats to do this effectively.
I think, over time, our system is probably going to make us a little bit more adept at dealing with a lot of countries, but we have to be able to offer something. And I think what you've seen from this administration and the last one is, what most countries want is economic engagement with the United States. And when we pull out of the transpacific partnership, when we put tariffs on countries, we leave the door wide open for China to come in and make some economic offerings, which are ultimately what most of these governments are really looking for. So, I do worry that, in the last couple of years, I think the Chinese have made a lot of headway and I think we've taken several steps back.
[00:23:54] Emma Ashford: This also makes me think of, again, another common wisdom here in D.C., which is that the U.S. and China are in competition for countries around the world. And I think this is just, you know, we're porting our Cold War mentality to today. But again, it seems a little more complicated than that, right? It's these cases where China is very much engaged economically and the U.S. is a security provider. And I'm not thrilled about that. But it also seems to me that neither side is winning that competition, either.
[00:24:24] Zack Cooper: I think that's exactly right. And part of what it demonstrates is, in the Cold War, right, take our allies in Europe, which you've written a huge amount about, we had essentially an alliance structure which had similar security interests and similar economic interests, right? We had a capitalist system going up against a socialist system. We had democracies going up against largely autocratic systems. And so, you had similarities in each of the blocs.
I think, now, you've got huge variation across these groupings. And that's why countries are going to depend on the U.S. and on China and on other parties in different ways. And the blocs are not going to be so set. I was at the Shangri La dialogue recently listening to President Macron talk at great length about strategic autonomy and how this was the answer for countries in Southeast Asia. This was not a pro-U.S. speech. This was a speech about having autonomy from both the U.S. and China. And I think we've got to accept, going forward, that even some of our allies and partners are going to have different interests. And they may suggest that, over time, other countries should align more with them and less with us. And that's just part of this new evolving multipolar world.
[00:25:39] Emma Ashford: Yeah. Even in the Cold War, it might be worth looking a little less at Western Europe and a little more at, let's say, Egypt, for example,
[00:25:44] Zack Cooper: Yeah. Or the Indo-Pacific, right? Which was much more varied in terms of political structures and alignments.
[00:25:52] Emma Ashford: So, if the U.S. is to engage in this kind of flexible coalition building, if we're going to compete with China on the front, whatever that means, what does your success look like? What is your vision for how the U.S., I don't want to say win the competition, but what would a success in 30 years look like?
[00:26:12] Zack Cooper: This is such a tough question. I'm not sure that I fully have the answer in my head, but I think it comes back to this fundamental issue of, what are our objectives? And I think, for most of the last 100 years, our objective, you may disagree with this, has been to prevent the rise of a hostile hegemon on the Eurasian continent. I think, certainly, that's still a piece of this. But the reality is that, as U.S. power decreases, we are going to have to be more realistic about our ability to prevent the rise of a hostile hegemon on the Eurasian continent. And I think we're going to have to ask some hard questions about what that means our actual interests are.
And so, I think we have to begin this discussion from the foundation of what we think the American people realistically want to be doing overseas now. And I mean, it's part of why I'm excited about the project you're doing. I think this is a debate that we can't just have in Washington. And we can't have it in different groups in Washington. You actually have to have agreement between Republicans and Democrats, between people who are more engagement-oriented and people who are more restraint-oriented, between officials and experts in this city, in Washington and those out in the rest of the country.
And they've got to have, maybe, not total agreement, but at least alignment on a shared vision. And we just don't have that in either party right now. And I think, to be honest, it's going to take us a while to get there. So, I'm trying to get my hands around this, but I don't think I have the answer yet.
[00:27:43] Emma Ashford: I'm hopeful that we will get there at some point. So, before we wrap up, there's one final question that I'm asking everybody, as we go through these podcasts. So, here at the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program, we are all about testing assumptions and questioning our priors. And so, let me ask you, what is one common assumption about U.S. foreign policy or common wisdom that you personally think we should reexamine or reconsider?
[00:28:11] Zack Cooper: We talked a little bit already about U.S. engagement in the Middle East, and that's certainly something that I would put on the list. But a second one, which I think is a huge risk that we're not thinking enough about, is the dangers of nuclear proliferation. I think we are heading into a world which, because it's more multipolar, means that U.S. extended deterrence may be weaker, both because the U.S. may not be able to extend deterrence in the way we have in the past, but also because other countries may not be so willing to depend entirely on Washington for extended deterrence. And that may mean that they look much more seriously at nuclear proliferation, including by U.S. allies.
And this is something that certainly happened during the Cold War. We had to take it very seriously. But to be honest, we've had almost 40 years where this really wasn't a primary concern for most countries. And I think we could see a chain of countries thinking very seriously about nuclear weapons. We're seeing discussion of this in Europe, whether it's Poland or Germany. We're seeing discussion in South Korea. Certainly, in the Middle East. And so, I don't think we can assume anymore that we're going to be in a world with under 10 nuclear powers. I think we could be in a world 10 years from now where we're talking about 15 or 20. I think that's a much scarier, much more concerning world. And we should be thinking about ways, both to prevent that today, but also thinking seriously about what that would mean for our security commitments and our relationships around the world, but especially, with those allies who might be proliferating.
[00:29:48] Emma Ashford: That's such a good point. And I think that's one big difference, right, is we've been in this period where nuclear proliferation were rogue states. It was the axis of evil. It was Iraq, Syria, and Iran. And we're shifting into a model where we're talking about Germany and South Korea and allied proliferation, which, as you know, was an issue in the Cold War. But we had to take some quite uncomfortable steps to handle it. So, definitely something policymakers are going to have to wrestle with, going forward.
So, I think that's all we have time for today. And I really appreciate you joining us and helping us think through some of the implications of multipolarity and coalitions. And would love to encourage our audience to read the full set of essays on the website. So, thank you.
[00:30:34] Zack Cooper: Thanks, Emma.
[00:30:35] Emma Ashford: Until next time. Goodbye.
That’s all for this episode of The Strategy Sessions. You can find the full set of episodes, along with the accompanying essays, at stimson.org or by searching for us on your favorite podcast app.
A big thanks to Stimson’s communications team for their assistance with the taping and to University FM for providing audio editing services. I’m Emma Ashford. Thanks for listening!